To litigate or not to litigate? The impacts of third-party financing on litigation by Deffains, Bruno & Desrieux, Claudine
To litigate or not to litigate?
The impacts of third-party financing on litigation
Bruno Deffains* Claudine Desrieux
Abstract
x
In this paper, we analyze three different ways to finance litigation, namely (i) self-
finance by plaintiffs, (ii) contingent fees arrangements and (iii) third-party financing.
We show how they impact the access to justice, and the decision to settle or to go to
court, when claims can be meritorious or frivolous. Our results show that third-party
financing does not always increase the access to justice for a plaintiff, and may even
decrease the equilibrium settlement amount. It also increases the number of frivolous
claims.
JEL codes: K0; K41
Keywords: Third-party financing; Litigation financing; Frivolous claims; Transaction
Costs.
1 Introduction
In Europe, the right for an injured party of a tortious or contractual wrongdoing to receive
compensation was granted a fundamental value (Protocol 1 of the European Convention
of Human Rights (Tuil and Visscher [2010])). However, in practice, the implementation
of this fundamental right is far from being satisfactory. Several types of losses do not
receive compensation because of the costs necessary to achieve it. In other words, legal
fees still represent an economic barrier to pursuing a lawsuit. As an illustration, the english
report “Access to Justice” (Lord Woolf [1996], chapter 7) mentions that “the problem of
costs is the most serious problem besetting our litigation system (...) Fear of costs deters
some litigants from litigating when they would otherwise be entitled to do so and compels
other litigants to settle their claims when they have no wish to do so. It enables the
more powerful litigant to take unfair advantage of the weaker litigant”. The same fears
regarding the high litigation costs are expressed in other countries. A 2007 report on
the transparency of costs of civil judicial proceddings in the EU shows that high levels
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of litigation costs are a concern in many European states.1 In Canada, the legal fees of
a typical civil case for a three days trial in the Ontario Court is estimated at $38,200 to
the plaintiff (Puri [1998]). These costs can become even higher if we include service of
process fees, fees relating to examination of discovery or expert testimony. In the same
way, in the U.S., pursuing a civil action in federal court costs an average of $15,000, the
Federal Judicial Center reported last year. Cases involving scientific evidence, like medical
malpractice claims, often cost more than $100,000.2 Recently, experts have estimated that
four-fifths of low-income people in the U.S. have no access to an attorney when they need
one.3
In such a context, there is a need to find alternative means to fund litigation. Among these
means, contingent fees are contracts in which an attorney pays for the litigation costs of a
plaintiff. The attorney obtains a percentage of the plaintiff’s award if the lawsuit succeeds,
but has no compensation if the lawsuit fails.4 Contingent legal fees are widely used in the
US. In around 87% of all torts and 53% of all contractual issues plaintiffs retain their
attorney on a contingency basis (Kritzer [1990]). In Europe, contingent fees were strictly
forbidden during a long time. However, Germany and the U.K. have recently allowed for
them.
Third party financing is another way to finance litigation: it is not the plaintiff nor the
attorney but some external “for-profit” funders that pay for the plaintiff’s litigation costs
in exchange for an agreed share of any recovered proceeds. As under contingent fees,
the funders get a percentage of the proceeds only if the claim is successful, either in
litigation or in settlement, and get noting if the claim fails. It is worth noting that third-
party financing is not a simple extension of contingent fees arrangements to a larger class
of funders. The first difference is that under contingent fees agreements, the attorney
retained provides services (i.e. he invests his time and resources in prosecuting a case),
rather than the funds necessary to procure such services. A second difference is that
funders choose to finance litigation with the expectation of a positive return that they
compare to alternative investments they could make on the financial market. Traditionally,
third party involvement in litigation was prohibited in common law as well as in civil law
countries. But things begin to change: In Australia, third party litigation funding has
been tolerated since the 1990s in some contexts, such as the disposition by liquidators or
trustees in bankruptcy of an insolvent’s causes of action. In some American state courts
(as in Maine or Ohio), third-party financing is now possible, as well as in England and
Wales (ILR [2009b]). The industry of third-party financing is also beginning to develop
in Germany.5 In many European countries (as in France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Austria or
1The average cost for a civil case in Europe is between 5 000 and 10 000 euros. For more de-
tails, see the report on the transparency of costs of civil judicial proceddings in the EU: https :
//e − justice.europa.eu/contentcostsofproceedings − 37 − en.do. In this context, the Family Law Bar
Association in England fears that legal aid cuts could put domestic abuse victims at risk, since they could
not afford costs to go to court (The Guardian, 24 October 2011). Still because of the high litigation costs,
lawyers in France recently fear for access to justice for the poors (Le Monde, 14 September 2013).
2“Funders Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts”, The New York Times, 14 November 2010.
3“Addressing the Justice Gap”, New York Times, 23 August 2011.
4This is often referred to as the “no win, no fee” principle. Let us also add that we consider here that
the “third party” is a for-profit one. We do not deal with other types of “third parties” as insurance or
government. This is consistent with the expression of “third party financing” that is today dedicated to
external funders.
5The most representative litigation funding company is Allianz ProzessFinanz, that has funded cases
including copyrights, contract, labor and employment, trade, corporat, insolvency and commercial matters.
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Belgium), law does not appear to prohibit third party financing, but the practice is rare
or even non-existent.
The proponents of third-party financing argue that it allows a better access to justice,
since it deeply lowers the budgetary constraint of the plaintiffs thanks to the large financial
means of the funders. The Jackson report on civil litigation costs6, which sought to increase
access to justice, gave important public approval for third-party financing: “it may be the
most effective means of promoting access to justice for a claim against, say, a multinational
pharmaceutical company”. However, as underlined by the Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform (ILR [2009a], p.4), increasing the access to courts also “increases the likelihood
that any potential defendant will be hauled into court on a meritless claim”. Indeed, critics
attack third-party funding on a variety of grounds, including that it increases frivolous
lawsuits, is unnecessary, creates conflicts of interest and imperils the relationship between
attorneys and clients. In addition, third-party financing implies the coordination of three
players (the attorney, the plaintiff and the funder) which raises new costs to organize the
relationship.
In this paper, we compare three different ways to finance litigation, namely self-finance,
contingent fees and third-party financing. Our comparison aims to establish what are the
impacts of each of these systems on (i) the number of plaintiffs accessing to courts, (ii)
the equilibrium settlement amounts, (iii) the decision of the defendant to settle or to go to
court, and (iv) the probability that an uninjured plaintiff decides to file a (frivolous) claim.
We do not aim to explore all possible ways to finance litigation, nor to seek to determine
which of these financing systems would be the most socially efficient. We only focus on
how third-party financing (whose potential introduction in several countries raises a lot
of debates) leads to different incentives for plaintiffs to file a claim, and for defendants to
settle or not, compared to self finance or contingent fees arrangements. Our main argument
is that coordinating a three-player relationship is more costly than coordinating a bilateral
one. To compensate for those higher charges, funders may require a higher rate of return
on capital when they finance litigation. Then, third-party financing overcomes the budget
constraint of the plaintiff, but leads to another “profitability” constraint: claims have to
be profitable enough to be financed so as to support the additional organizational costs.
We also extend our model by introducing asymmetric information. We assume that the
defendant may face two types of plaintiff: a truly injured one and an uninjured one. The
defendant is the only agent who cannot distinguish between a frivolous and a meritorious
one. We show that under each litigation financing system, two types of equilibria appear,
according to the defendant’s belief of the probability that the claim is meritorious. Our
results highlight that the higher the rate of return on capital the funders require under
third-party financing, (i) the lower the probability that a plaintiff accesses to court is,
and (ii) the lower the equilibrium settlement amount offered by the defendant is. As a
consequence, (iii) the higher the probability that the defendant decides to settle rather
than to go to court is, and (iv) the higher the probability that an uninjured plaintiff opens
a file with the hopes of obtaining a settlement is. This allows us to show that third-party
financing may be more beneficial to frivolous claims than meritorious ones, and that it
may even lead to higher total litigation costs under some conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 relates our paper to the previous
In 2004, only 0,4% of cases used third-party financing in Germany as for Jackson LJ Review of civil litigation
costs: Preliminary Report (2009, p. 564).
6Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs, April 2010, para 4.4.4.
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literature. In section 3, we describe the benefits and costs of third-party financing, and
justify why it leads to a higher opportunity cost to raise funds. In section 4, we compare
the types of litigation financing when claims are meritorious. In section 5, we consider
that claims can be either meritorious or frivolous. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The basic theoretical framework of our model is inspired by Katz [1990] and Miceli [1994].
Katz [1990] presents a model that explains frivolous suits as a result of defendant un-
certainty regarding the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. We adopt the same definition of a
“frivolous lawsuit”, i.e. a suit that has sufficiently low chance of prevailing at trial so that
it would not be brought but is filed only in the hopes of obtaining a favorable settlement.
In other words, a frivolous lawsuit is “that of an uninjured plaintiff obtaining a payment to
which he is not entitled, at the expense of an uninformed defendant” (Katz [1990]). Miceli
[1994] compares two types of litigation financing, namely hourly fees paid by the plaintiff
and contingent fees arrangements, when claims can be either meritorious or frivolous. We
extend this framework into two directions: first, we introduce a third type of litigation fi-
nancing, i.e. third-party financing under which external funders finance the claim. Second,
we introduce a cost constraint on the plaintiff: while Miceli [1994] assumes that a plaintiff
can always afford to go to court, we rather consider that a plaintiff cannot finance the cost
to go to court above some threshold. This allows us to show that each financing system
has two kind of distinguished impacts: an impact on the ex-ante probability to access to
courts, and an impact on the probability that a frivolous claim arises, while Katz [1990]
and Miceli [1994] do not consider the problem of access to justice for a credit-constrained
plaintiff.
Up to now, many papers in the law and economics literature have wondered how to finance
litigation (Heyes et al. [2004], Kirstein and Rickman [2004]). Legal aid (Dnes and Rickman
[1998], Rickman et al. [1999], Garoupa and Stephen [2004], George [2006]) and insurance
(Faure and De Mot [2012], Hylton [2011]) have already been explored. Contigent fees have
also been deeply studied (Dana and Spier [1993], Rubinfeld and Scotchmer [1993], Emons
[2000], Emons and Garoupa [2006], Emons [2007], Fenn and Rickman [2010], Cotten and
Santore [2012]). Third-party financing (as the funding of litigation by external investors)
has drawn far less attention. Our paper thus contributes to the emerging economic litera-
ture on this topic. Chen and Abrams [2013] is the first empirical paper about third-party
financing. Using two sources of variation - de jure status of third party litigation funding
in different Australian states as well as variation in third party litigation funding from
the largest litigation funding firm in Australia - they find evidence that litigation, court
caseloads, and court expenditures increase with third party funding. Rubin [2011] shows
how overall increasing third party financing of litigation is likely to be harmful, since
it would increase external costs such as the costs imposed on defendants. In addition,
the type of lawsuits that would likely result from increased third party investment would
probably move the legal system away from efficiency. Lyon [2010] looks at how potential
negative consequences of third-party financing can be effectively addressed through en-
forcement of existing ethical and procedural guidelines or by adoption of new regulations.
Considering that the interest rates funders charge reflect the funder’s information about
the strength of the plaintiff’s case, Avraham and Wickelgren [2011] analyze a signaling
model in which the plaintiff can introduce its funding contract as evidence. They show that
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there exists a separating equilibrium in which the funder’s information is fully-revealed.
Demougin and Maultzsch [2013] propose to study other agency problems that can be raised
under third-party financing, especially between the funder and the attorney. They deter-
mine how a combination of contingency fees and third-party financing may be the best way
to overcome agency problems and financial constraints of would-be plaintiffs who would
like to pursue meritorious claims. Their paper deals with how to discipline attorneys while
we rather focus on the consequences of third-party financing on the plaintiffs’ behavior,
and do not introduce agency relationship. Instead of focusing on the conflict of interest
between the three-player (the attorney, the litigant and the funder), we consider here the
opportunity cost to raise funds. This original perspective has been little developped up
to now, and we show why it matters as it directly impacts on access to justice for the
plaintiffs and on their decision to settle or to go to court.
3 Understanding third-party financing
“Third-party financing” corresponds to the funding of litigation by an external investor
who has no pre-existing interest in the litigation, usually on the basis that (i) the funder
will be paid out of the proceeds of any amounts recovered as a consequence of the litigation,
often as a percentage of the recovery sum; and (ii) the funder is not entitled to payment
should the claim fail.7 We summarize in this section the main arguments regarding the
debate about third-party financing.
3.1 Third-party financing: the potential benefits
First, third-party financing can be regarded as a market for buying and selling lawsuits,
creating a market for the production of justice (Chen and Abrams [2013]). The main ex-
pectation is to allow credit-constrained plaintiffs to access to justice, and thus contributing
to reduce litigation undersupply.
In addition, third-party financing could serve to remedy a longstanding imbalance of power
that favors defendants. For instance, when an individual plaintiff files a claim against a
corporate defendant, financial disparities often represent a barrier to victory for the plain-
tiff. Third-party financing contributes to place the litigant on a more stable financial
footing. Some other benefits are expected. For instance, risk adverse individuals could
decline to pursue positive expected value claims, and a transfer of a claim from a risk-
averse to a risk-neutral party should yield an increase in total claims pursued. Some claim
holders can also be unaware that they possess a meritorious legal claim, and third-party
financing provides the funders with the incentives to locate and provide information to
those unaware claim holders.
Let us also add that there is undoubtedly a market for litigation finance. Companies8
7As underlined by Daughety and Reinganum [2014], “there are three primary forms of litigation funding
(...) These are: 1) consumer legal funding, wherein a third party provides a non-recourse loan directly to a
plaintiff; 2) loans to plaintiffs’ law firms, wherein a funder provides an ordinary secured loan to a law firm,
and 3) investments in commercial claims, wherein a funder provides an up-front payment in exchange for a
share of the eventual recovery.” While Daughety and Reinganum [2014] focus on the first type of financing,
we examine the last kind of funding contract.
8Names in the industry are (among others) Allianz ProzessFinanz, Harbour Litigation Funding, IM
Litigation Funding, Juridica Capital Management, Burford Capital Limited, Credit Suisse.
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that have begun offering such services have enjoyed favorable results. Third party funders
generally seek anywhere from 20% to 50% of the claimant’s recovery (ILR [2009b]), which
can constitute a return on investment upward of 200%.9 An example comes from IMF that
is the largest litigation funding firm in the Australian market. Its return on investment
was superior to 300% between october 2006 and february 2008 (Chen and Abrams [2013]).
3.2 Third-party financing: the potential costs
In spite of these potential benefits, third-party financing also leads to serious concerns and
difficulties. The first concern is about the possible increase of meritless claims. Because
third-party litigation financing increases the overall financing available for litigation and
reduces the attorney’s own risk, the incentives for bringing frivolous claims may be in-
creased. This danger may be all the more worrying as financiers “have little incentives to
investigate whether the claims they finance are frivolous, because the risk of loss would be
spread among hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of funders” (ILR [2009b]). Funders
may also be willing to finance claims with a low probability of success but a high potential
amount of recovery.10 A second concern is that the development of third-party financing
is also seen as creating a compensation culture driven by profit-seeking financial entities
(Veljanovski [2012]). Third-party financing is not insurance but investment: it draws the
attention of funders because it is uncorrelated with other asset classes, perhaps mildly
counter-cyclical11, and offers high (but risky) awards. Only claims with a financial remedy
are funded. Actions for specific performance and injunctive relied are not considered for
the reason that there was no financial outcome in which to share. Last, a third concern
is that the participation of a funder as a third party is likely to cause higher transaction
costs than in a two-party scenario like a conventional attorney-client relationship. Trans-
action costs are here considered as the costs spent to organize the three-player contractual
relationship. The reasons why transaction costs should be higher are the following ones:
 In many countries where third-party financing is allowed, two contracts are signed:
one between the plaintiff and her attorney and another contract between the plaintiff
and the funder.12 This raises contracting costs compared to contingent fees where
there is only one contract between the plaintiff and her attorney.
 Bargaining costs should also increase under third-party financing compared to other
financing systems, since many aspects of the relationship with the financier have to
9Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 Vt. L. Rev. 615,
620-21 (2007) (explaining that the financier’s share of any recovery can be more than 200% of the amount
financed).
10As Mick Smith of third party litigation funder Clunius Captial has observed: “the perception that you
need strong merits is wrong - there’s a price for everything” (ILR [2009b], p.12). In the same way, quoting
a technical director of a hedge fund, the report of the Chamber institute for Legal Reforms (ILR [2009a],
p. 3) states that “In a typical case[,] a hedge fund, acting on behalf of already wealthy funders, will seek to
accumulate yet more money (...) by gambling on the outcome of a legal action for damages. They have no
interest in the justice or otherwise of the case -only in the chances of success - as they will demand a share
of the damages awarded in return for putting up the stake money”.
11During recessions, agents may get more incentives to misbehave and then offend more plaintiffs leading
to an increase in meritorious claims.
12See for instance Demougin and Maultzsch [2013]: “it does not come as a surprise that some litiga-
tion financing contracts usually include an additional fee in favor of the attorney who has not only to
communicate with his client but also with the financier” (p.6).
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be negotiated, such as the sharing of the control (and the right to decide) over the
claim.
 Another factor of cost increase comes from the litigation risk assessment the funders
have to make. While attorneys have obvious expertise in evaluating the meritorious-
ness and settlement value of litigation, other potential funders need to hire attorneys
to conduct this inquiry for them. The risk assessment depends on quite a few uncer-
tain variables: the facts, the current law, the jury pool, the presiding judge, the skills
and incentive structure of the opposing counsel, risk aversion of the opposing party,
and more generally his incentive to settle (Faure and De Mot [2012]). A detailed
analysis of the merits of a claim would lead to high administrative costs.
 During all the procedure, the decision-making is shared between the plaintiff and the
funder, which is likely to create conflicts.13 The interests of the three parties (the
plaintiff, the financier and the attorney) may diverge, and solving such conflicts is
time-consuming and costly (Waye [2007]). Timothy Hart, Vice President, Account-
ing & Financial Consulting for Huron Consulting Group, has said that clients may
have to relinquish some decision-making authority to the funder and that“the client’s
interests may diverge from the funder in that other business reasons may suggest that
they might settle a claim for less than the funder has targeted” (ILR [2009a]). Con-
flicts could also arise between the funders and the attorney, if a third-party financier
directs or regulates the attorney’s professional judgment (ILR [2009a,b]).
All these reasons suggest that third-party financing is much more costly to organize than
a traditional bilateral relationship. Investors will select claims that are “profitable” enough
to overcome these costs. For this reason, they ask a higher “rate of return” on capital when
they finance a claim compared to what is expected under contingent fees or self-finance.
The legislature about third-party financing mentions that funders are allowed to require
a rate of recovery allowing them to finance all their charges (See for instance Nebraska
Legislative Bill 1094 or the Maine Legislature (Public Law, chapter 394, H.P. 1186 - L.D.
1703, 123rd Legislature)). In the following sections, we modelize how this matters when
all cases are known to be meritorious (section 4), and when the claims can be either
meritorious or frivolous (section 5).
4 Financing litigation when claims are meritorious
In this section, we focus on meritorious claims: we consider a plaintiff (to whom we refer
as “she”), who is truly injured and will get a compensation D > 0 when going to trial.14
4.1 The theoretical framework
The plaintiff can initiate a claim by filing a lawsuit at an initial cost f . This amount
includes the cost of preparing and filing a complain and making the fact of the lawsuit
13In 2006, in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v. Fostif Pty Ltd, a five-to-two majority of the Australian
High Court held that a third-party funder may exercise significant control over the litigation, and that this
control is not an abuse of process and does not offend public policy in states that have abolished maintenance
and champerty as crimes and torts.
14For simplicity, we consider here that the injured plaintiff will get a damage D with probability equal to
one, i.e. the judge does not make any mistake. We could alternatively assume that D = pJ > 0 with J the
expected award at trial and p ∈ (0, 1) the probability for the plaintiff to win at trial when she is injured.
7
known to the defendant. A settlement period follows during which the plaintiff and de-
fendant, through their attorneys, attempt to negotiate a settlement. The attorney costs
of this period are Rp and Rd for the plaintiff and defendant, respectively. As in Miceli
[1994], we assume that these costs are time costs that the attorney incurs whether or not a
settlement is reached. If a settlement is not reached, the case goes to trial.15 The plaintiff
and defendant incur additional attorney costs of Cp and Cd. The plaintiff receives a dam-
age D. Our theoretical framework involves the following important assumptions: First,
the expected damage D exceeds the plaintiff’s filing plus attorney costs, so that a claim
is always worth being filed, even if it goes to court: D − Cp − Rp − f > 0. We make this
assumption to focus on the impact of the different litigation financing systems for a claim
that deserves to be filed.16
Second, the plaintiff and the defendant incur no other costs apart the attorney fees, and
there is no disagreement between the plaintiff and the defendant over the judgment at
trial (the value D) or the costs of trial (Cp and Cd). Information about the costs and the
damage is then symmetric.17
Third, the market for attorneys is a competitive market: attorneys are identical in ability
and their identity does not impact on the size of the damage at trial. Then, the plaintiff’s
attorney expects to earn zero profits, regardless of the fee arrangement. This assumption
is made to isolate the impact of the fee arrangement on the disposition of a case.18
Fourth, during the settlement period, the defendant makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement
offer. The assumption of a single offer from the defendant is a restrictive one, but we
abstract from this issue because our main goal is not to provide a general solution to the
bargaining problem, but to see what determines the decision to settle or to go to court.
Fifth, the plaintiff and the defendant support their own litigation costs.
Sixth, to underline the problem of cost barriers to access to justice, we impose some
cost constraints on the plaintiff to go to court. The cost to go to court for the plain-
tiff Cp is distributed according to a probability density function z on [C
min
p , C
max
p ], with
0 < Cminp < C
max
p . Its value is determined before the plaintiff initiates the claim, and
known by all. The variety of possible costs may reflect the variety of possible injuries the
plaintiff may suffer from, and then the different types of claims she may hold (even if the
claim is meritorious in each case). In other words, for a same expected damage D, the
cost to go to trial may be different according to the type of injury.
We assume that a plaintiff can self finance the initial cost to file a lawsuit f and the lit-
igation costs during the settlement Rp. However, she can finance the cost to go to court
Cp up to an amount C¯ (known by all) so that C
min
p < C¯ < C
max
p .
Then, when Cp > C¯, the plaintiff cannot finance on her own the litigation, and then does
not initiate the claim since she has no credibility to threat to go to court (unless she
15In this section, the plaintiff will never drop a case rather than go to trial since claims are assumed to
be meritorious.
16In other words, our concern is not to know whether it is socially efficient or not to file a claim. As
discussed in the conclusion, we follow to some extent the U.S. Supreme Court’s observation about the
“great benefits” of attorney advertising in Bates (Bates v. State Bar Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977)) and
make it applicable to our framework: “ Although [it] might increase the use of the judicial machinery, we
cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it
by legal action”.
17We deserve information asymmetries for section 5. These asymmetries will bear on the nature of the
claim (frivolous or meritorious) that is unknown to the defendant.
18The assumption of a competitive market for attorneys has been subject to some debates: see Osiel
[1990], Hadfield [2000], Crabdall and Winston [2011]. We discuss in conclusion this assumption.
8
chooses one of the two other litigation financing). Under contingent fees arrangements,
the attorney can finance the litigation costs Rp and the cost to go to court Cp until an
amount C¯ (also known by all), with Cmaxp > C¯ > C¯. Under third-party financing, the
funders may finance Rp and Cp with no cost constraint on Cp.
Last, we make the simplifying assumption that the cost to go to court for the defendant
(Cd) is constant so as to focus only on the barrier to access to justice for the plaintiff when
the cost Cp is high.
19 Then, in our model, the claim can be that of a corporate defendant
and an individual plaintiff.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. An injury occurs to the plaintiff.
2. The parties learn the cost Cp ∈ [Cminp ;Cmaxp ] to go to court for this injury.
3. The plaintiff decides to file a claim at cost f or not.
4. The attorney costs Rp and Rd have to be paid.
5. The settlement period occurs.
6. If the settlement fails, the plaintiff goes to court, and then pays the attorney cost
Cp. The defendant’s attorney cost to go to trial is Cd (a constant).
7. The judgement is made and the plaintiff receives a damage D.
In the following subsections, we examine the ex-ante probability that a claim can be
financed and the decision to settle or to go to trial under each type of litigation financing.
4.2 Equilibrium under self finance
We first determine here the ex ante probability (i.e. the probability at date 1, before
the realization of Cp) that a claim can be financed.
20 Under self-finance, the plaintiff can
afford to go to trial when Cp ≤ C¯. Since the plaintiff’s cost to go to court is distributed
according to the probability density function z (reflecting the type of his injury), parties
anticipate that this will occur with a probability xSF (“SF” stands for “self-finance”) such
that xSF =
∫ C¯
0 z(Cp)dCp. Still at date 1, the parties anticipate that the claim will not be
opened with a probability (1− xSF ) ∈ (0, 1) because the plaintiff will not credibly threat
to go to court. In this situation, the defendant will make no offer during the settlement,
so that the plaintiff prefers not to file his claim (that costs f).21
19As many other contributions on third-party financing, we only explore funding of plaintiffs’expenses
because the methods and mechanisms of plaintiff-side lending are somewhat different than those on the
defense side, and the market is significantly more developed (Lyon [2010], Molot [2009]).
20Let’s note that the parties learn whether the claim can be financed or not as soon as Cp is realized:
by the time the plaintiff has to decide to go to court or not (at date 3), the realization of Cp is common
knowledge and the parties know whether the plaintiff can afford to go to trial or not.
21Since the goal of this paper is to compare the different ways to finance litigation for credit-constrained
plaintiffs, we implicitly consider that they cannot borrow money. In other words, D − C¯p − Rp − f −
r(Cp− C¯p) < 0 where r is the interest rate. Avraham and Wickelgren [2011] and Grous [2006] also mention
that borrowing money from traditional lenders is generally unavailable for plaintiffs that are likely to use
third-party financing.
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We now determine the settlement amount for claims that have been filed under self-finance.
As in Katz [1990] and Miceli [1994], the game is solved by reasoning backwards from its
last stage, where the plaintiff must choose between accepting the defendant’s offer S or
going to trial.
When going to trial, the plaintiff gets an amount D of damages since her claim is mer-
itorious. In the previous stage, i.e. in the settlement period, the defendant offers a
settlement amount SSF equal to the lowest amount the plaintiff will accept rather than go
to trial.22 This amount is found by equating the marginal value of a trial for the plaintiff,
D − Cp −Rp − f , with the value of a settlement, SSF −Rp − f . Thus,
SSF = D − Cp (1)
where SSF is positive since D − Cp − Rp − f > 0. Notice that neither the attorney’s fee
for the settlement period (Rp) nor the filing cost f affect SSF since they are sunk at the
point the plaintiff must accept or reject the offer. In contrast, because the plaintiff avoids
paying the trial fee (Cp) by settling, the defendant reduces his settlement offer by that
amount. Given (1), the plaintiff’s net return from the suit is D − Cp which just equals
her expected return from going to trial. This reflects the assumption that the defendant
extracts all of the surplus from the settlement.23
Lemma 1. Under self-finance, some meritorious claims are not filed because of potential
cost barriers. When the costs of litigation do not prevent the access to court, then parties
prefer to settle than to go to court to save on additional attorney costs.
4.3 Equilibrium under contingent fees arrangements
Under contingent fees arrangements, the highest amount of cost the attorney can bear is
C¯ > C¯. The claim can be credibly filed with an ex-ante probability xCF (“CF” stands
for “contingent fees”) such that xCF =
∫ C¯
0 z(Cp)dCp. Since C¯ > C¯, then xCF > xSF .
This can be interpreted very intuitively: the attorneys can support higher litigation costs
than the plaintiff, so that there is a higher probability at the beginning of the game that
a claim can be financed under contingent fees arrangements than under self-finance. With
probability (1− xCF ), contingent fees will not allow to finance the cost Cp and the claim
will not be filed.
To determine the settlement amount when the claim is filed under contingent fees, we
denote βs ∈ (0, 1) the percentage of the recovery the attorney gets when the claim is
settled, and βt ∈ (0, 1) the share he gets when the case goes to trial.24
The expected payoff of the plaintiff when going to trial is then (1 − βt)D. By denoting
22We assume that when the plaintiff is indifferent between going to court and settling, she chooses the
settlement.
23As it will be shown in subsection 4.5., this assumption about the bargaining game does not impact our
general result.
24The rate the attorney gets is not the same if the case is settled or goes to court. The American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1983
states that “ a contingent fee agreement (...) shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined,
including the percentage (...) that shall accrue to the attorney in the event of settlement, trial or appeal”
(Rule 1.5). Emons [2000] (p.21) mentions that “ in a typical tort case in the United States, the plaintiff’s
attorney (...) gets one third if the case is settled without trial, 40% if the plaintiffs wins a trial, and 50%
if a judgement for the plaintiff is affirmed on appeal”.
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SCF her expected return when accepting a settlement, the condition for the equilibrium
settlement amount becomes:
(1− βs)SCF = (1− βt)D (2)
At equilibrium, the condition for zero profit for the attorneys operating in a competitive
market allows to determine the percentage of recovery they get. The net payoff of a
attorney in case of settlement is βsSCF − Rp so that βs = RpSCF . In the same way, an
attorney gets βtD −Rp − Cp when going to trial, so that βt = Cp+RpD .25 Then,
(2)⇔ SCF = βsSCF +D − βtD = Rp +D − Cp −Rp
= D − Cp = SSF
Lemma 2. Under contingent fees arrangements, the probability for an injured plaintiff
to access to justice is higher than under self-finance (but is not equal to one), and the
equilibrium settlement amount is the same than under self-finance litigation.
4.4 Equilibrium under third-party financing
Under third-party financing, some external funders finance the claim, and get back a
share of the proceeds if the claim is settled or goes successfully to court. However, as
stated by McLaughlin [2007] (p.621), “the litigation-funding industry carries heavy costs”.
Coordinating three parties (the funder, the attorney and the plaintiff) is more costly than
managing a bilateral relationship, as described in subsection 3.2. Two contracts need to
be approved and signed, bargaining and administrative costs are likely to increase as well
as costly potential conflicts. Many legislatures mention that the rate of return asked by
the funders has to take into account those direct and indirect charges.26 For this reason,
we assume that the funders require a minimal rate of return on capital k ≥ 0 to finance
a claim. We can also interpret k as the additional profitability rate the investors require
(compared to lawyers or plaintiffs) so as to support the indirect charges caused by the
coordination of the three-party relationship.27
We denote γs ∈ (0, 1) (resp. γt ∈ (0, 1)) the share of the recovery required by the funders
if the claim is settled (resp. if the case goes to trial).28 During settlement, the defendant
25Note that in this case, βt is hypothetical since no case goes to trial. However, it must be defined in
theory so that SCF can be derived. Moreover, the plaintiff is willing to enter into the agreement since her
remaining gain (1 − βt)D allows her to pay for the cost f to file a claim: (1 − βt)D = D − Cp − Rp ≥ f .
In the same way, at equilibrium, (1− βs)SCF ≥ f so that the “participation constraint” of the plaintiff is
fulfilled.
26For instance, in Nebraska (see Legislative Bill 1094) or the Maine Legislature (Public Law, chapter
394, H.P. 1186 - L.D. 1703, 123rd Legislature).
27Beyond the additional costs they have to support, external investors are likely to require a higher rate
of return on investment than the attorneys or the plaintiffs, because their opportunity cost is likely to
be higher: funders may more easily diversify their investment and may require the same rate of return
on capital they could earn in an alternative investment of equivalent risk. Without providing technical
details that would be beyond the scope of this paper, the funders determine the rate of return they require
by comparing the investment in litigation to other comparable investments with similar risk profiles to
determine the “market” cost of capital. It is commonly equated using the CAPM (capital asset pricing
model) formula.
28In the U.K., these rates range between 20 % and 40 % of the award/settlement, and in some cases 50
% or higher. In Australia, rates are between 30 % and 60 % (Veljanovski [2012], p.22).
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offers a settlement amount ST equal to the lowest amount the plaintiff will accept rather
than go to trial, i.e. ST such that:
(1− γs)ST = (1− γt)D (3)
Let us determine the values of γs and γt. The funders agree to finance a claim if:
γsST −Rp
Rp
≥ k (4a) γtD −Rp − Cp
Rp + Cp
≥ k (4b)
(4a) and (4b) can be interpreted as the participation constraints of the funders. By iso-
lating γs and γt, we get:
γs ≥ Rp(k + 1)
ST
(5a) γt ≥ (k + 1)(Cp +Rp)
D
(5b)
However, for the plaintiff to agree to participate, her remaining share of the proceeds has
to be high enough to allow her to pay the cost f to file a claim, i.e.:
(1− γs)ST − f ≥ 0⇒ γs ≤ 1− f
ST
(6)
and (1− γt)D − f ≥ 0⇒ γt ≤ 1− f
D
(7)
By assuming that the plaintiff has all the bargaining power29, we get γs =
Rp(k+1)
ST
and
γt =
(k+1)(Cp+Rp)
D . By replacing γs and γt by their values in (3), we have :
ST (k) = D − Cp(k + 1) (8)
Let us now precise the conditions under which a claim is filed under third-party financing.
Putting equation (8) in equations (6) and (7), and knowing that γs =
Rp(k+1)
ST
and γt =
(k+1)(Cp+Rp)
D , the participation constraints of the plaintiff can be reduced to the following
condition:
D − (Cp +Rp)(k + 1)− f ≥ 0 (9)
Then, parties know at date 1 (before the realization of Cp) that third-party financing can
be credibly implemented if equation (9) is verified. By isolating Cp in equation (9), the
condition becomes:
Cp ≤ Cˆ(k) = D − f
k + 1
−Rp (10)
29This assumption has no impact on our general results regarding equation (8). Let’s assume that
the bargaining power of the plaintiff (resp. the funders) is z ∈ (0, 1) (resp. (1 − z)) and that Nash
bargaining occurs. When they share the amount ST , the minimum share the plaintiff accepts is f , while
the funders participate only if they get at least (k + 1)Rp. The remaining share of the surplus to split is
(ST − (k+ 1)Rp− f). The plaintiff gets f + z[ST − (k+ 1)Rp− f ]. Symmetrically, the funders ask at least
(k+ 1)(Rp +Cp) if the case goes to court, so that the plaintiff gets f + z[D− (k+ 1)(Cp +Rp)− f ]. Then,
the plaintiff accepts to settle if she gets f + z[ST − (k + 1)Rp − f ] = f + z[D − (k + 1)(Cp + Rp)− f ] ⇔
ST = D − Cp(k + 1) (Equation (8)).
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The ex-ante probability (at date 1) to finance a claim under third-party financing is
xT (k) =
∫ Cˆ(k)
0 z(Cp)dCp. Since
∂Cˆ(k)
∂k < 0, then the higher the required rate of return
on capital is, the lower the maximum cost Cˆ(k) the funders accept to finance is.30 They
select claims that are not too costly, else they could not reach the rate of return on invest-
ment k. We also note that ∂xT (k)∂k ≤ 0: the ex-ante probability that a claim can be financed
under third-party financing decreases with k. The higher the rate of return required by
the investors is, the fewer claims are likely to be financed: only the most profitable ones
will draw their attention.
To sum up, the ex-ante probability that a claim is filed under third-party financing is
xT (k) =
∫ Cˆ(k)
0 z(Cp)dCp, and parties agree to settle for ST = D − Cp(k + 1).
4.5 Comparisons of settlement equilibria
We compare here the ex ante probabilities that a claim is financed under the different
financing systems, and the equilibrium settlement amounts that occur in each case.
From lemma 2, contingent fees increase the probability to finance a claim compared to
self-finance. If we now compare the ex-ante probability to finance a claim under third-
party financing (xT (k)) to the probability under contingent fees (xCF ), we can determine
a threshold above (resp. below) which third-party financing decreases (resp. enlarges) the
access to justice. Proof n°1 in the appendix determines this threshold kˆ. It shows that:
∀k ∈ (0, kˆ], xT (k) ≥ xCF
and ∀k > kˆ, xT (k) < xCF
This can be interpreted as follows: the proportion of claims that can be financed under
third-party financing decreases with k. Then, there is a threshold above which the rate of
return on capital required by the investors is so high that third-party financing allows to
finance a lower number of claims than contingent fees.31
This means that the merit of a claim is not sufficient to be financed by third parties.
Because third-party financing raises additional costs compared to the other types of fi-
nancings (to organize the three-player relationship), claims have to be profitable enough
for the funders not to make losses. Even if there is no cost barrier as under self finance
or contingent fees arrangements, third-party financing implies a “profitability” barrier that
restricts the number of claims that can be filed. Then, this litigation financing does not
necessarily enlarge the number of cases that accesses to justice.
Let us now determine whether third-party financing improves the settlement conditions.
By ranking the settlement amounts under the different financing systems, we get from
equations (1), (2), and (8):
ST (k) ≤ SSF = SCF (11)
30Let us also note that ∂Cˆ(k)
∂D
> 0: the higher D is, the more willing the funders are to finance a high
cost to go to court. However, we assume here that D depends on the type of injury (and is fixed and
exogenous), and does not depend on the type of litigation financing. We deserve such an investigation for
further works.
31As an illustration of the selection process operated by investors before deciding to finance a claim
or not, Chen and Abrams [2013] (p.14) mention that litigation firms generally do not fund cases below
$750,000 in value. This shows that investors select claims to be financed on profitability criteria.
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The lower amount under third-party financing comes from the fact that by accepting to
settle, the funders avoid to invest Cp(k+1) at the following period. They save both on the
plaintiff’s cost to go to court (Cp) as well as on the transaction costs they would support
by going to court (kCp).
Proof n°2 in the Appendix shows that (11) still holds if we assume Nash Bargaining rather
than “take-it-or-leave-it” offer during the settlement period.
Lemma 3. Funders finance claims whose costs allow them to be profitable enough. When
a claim is filed and settlement occurs, the settlement amount under contingent fees (or
self-finance) is equal or superior to that observed under third party financing.
Given lemmas 1, 2 and 3, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1. There is no litigation financing system that allows to finance all types
of meritorious claims a plaintiff may hold. The access to justice is constrained by a cost
barrier under self-finance and contingent fees, and by a “profitability” barrier under third-
party financing.
5 Financing litigation when claims can be meritorious or
frivolous
Let us now consider a situation where the defendant cannot observe whether the claim of
the plaintiff is meritorious or frivolous. Then, the plaintiff can be truly injured or not. For
instance, an individual may be involved in an accident but sustained no injuries. Another
example is a products liability case in which injury is undisputed, but the plaintiff is not
entitled to damages if she was contributorily negligent in using the product (Katz [1990]).
We still assume that the judges do not make any mistake: they allow for damages only
for meritorious claims, and are able to detect frivolous claims that get no damage. There
is then no value to pursue a claim to trial for an uninjured plaintiff. However, it may be
profitable for her to file suit in hopes of obtaining a settlement. As defined in section 2, we
consider a frivolous claim as that of an uninjured plaintiff obtaining payment to which she
is not entitled to, during the settlement period. They are not suits for which the plaintiffs
wrongly believe that they are entitled to a recovery. As explained by Katz [1990] (p.4), “in
order to explain how frivolous suits can persist, it is necessary to explain why defendants
might be willing to offer positive amounts in settlement to a frivolous suitor”.
The timing of the game becomes as follows:
1. A plaintiff can randomly be injured or not in an accident.
2. The cost Cp for the plaintiff to go to court for such an injury (Cp ∈ [Cminp ;Cmaxp ]) is
revealed.32
3. The plaintiff chooses whether to file a claim at cost f or not.
32We assume that there is only one possible injury during the accident that occurs, so that an uninjured
plaintiff can try to misrepresent as a victim of this injury, but not as a victim of a different injury, whose
cost would be different from the value of Cp.
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4. The attorney’s costs Rp and Rd are paid.
5. The settlement period occurs.
6. If the settlement fails, the plaintiff can drop or pay Cp to go to trial. The defendant
pays Cd.
7. The judgment is made and the information is revealed: only meritorious claims get
the damage D.
We focus in this section on the number of frivolous suits filed and the consequences on
settlement under each type of litigation financing i ∈ {SF ;CF ;T}. The assumptions are
the same as in the previous section, except that the defendant does not know whether
the case is meritorious or frivolous.33 Yet, the attorney of the plaintiff can observe (and
communicate to funders) the merit of the claim.34 The attorneys accept to finance a case
only if they can expect at least zero profits, and the funders finance the claim if they expect
a rate of return on capital k ≥ 0. Moreover, whether frivolous or not, the plaintiff has the
same cost constraint to finance Cp as that described in the previous section.
35 What the
defendant cannot observe is only an individual plaintiff’s type (i.e. whether the plaintiff
is truly injured or not).
We introduce some other notations:
α ∈ (0, 1) is the initial probability that an accident occurs at date 1, i.e. that a plaintiff is
truly injured. This probability is exogenous, known by the defendant, and does not change
as regards to the type of financing.
θi ∈ [0, 1] is the probability with which an uninjured plaintiff files suit under financing
system i. The uninjured plaintiff decides to file a claim if she anticipates that the defendant
will prefer to settle rather than to bring the case to court. Then, θi represents the strategy
of the uninjured plaintiff who has to choose between opening a file or not.
ψi ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the defendant settles under financing system i. This
variable describes the strategy of the defendant.
Then, the equilibrium we use is a sequential equilibrium where θ∗i and ψ
∗
i represent the best
responses of the uninjured plaintiff and of the defendant. From the previous notations, we
can deduce:
 The probability that a plaintiff opens a claim: A plaintiff is truly injured with prob-
ability α. In this case, she always opens a claim as she knows she will get D when
going to trial. With probability (1 − α), a plaintiff is uninjured: in this case, she
opens a claim with probability θ, i.e. if she expects that the defendant will prefer to
33We assume that the attorney of the defendant has no acces to all the information about the plaintiff so
that he cannot determine with certainty the merit of the claim. As in Katz [1990] (p.8), we also abstract
from the fact that in an actual lawsuit the defendant may wish to spend resources to investigate the claim’s
validity, for example by paying for a medical examination or by engaging in civil discovery. Instead, we
consider that complete information is likely to be prohibitively costly, so that the defendant can only
estimate a probability that the claim is meritorious, and this probability is that remaining after optimal
investigation.
34Remember that additional costs created by third-party financing comes from expertise to learn the
merits of the claims, as described in subsection 3.2.
35This implies that the ex-ante probability that a claim can be financed under financing system i is the
same as in section 4. This is the probability xi (with i ∈ {SF ;CF ;T}) at date 1 that the cost Cp belongs
to the range of costs that can be financed under financing system i. Both truly injured and uninjured
plaintiffs elaborate their strategies when Cp can be financed (which is public knowledge at date 2).
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settle rather than to bring the case to court (since she will get no compensation by
going to court). Then, the probability that a plaintiff files a claim is α+ (1− α)θ.
 The conditional probability that a plaintiff who files suit is truly injured : We denote
this probability α∗i where α
∗
i =
α
α+θ(1−α) according to the Bayes’ rule. Then,
α∗i ≥ α (12)
5.1 Equilibrium under self finance
5.1.1 The strategy of the defendant
When a claim is filed, the defendant does not know whether the claim is frivolous or not.
He has three strategies:
1. He can either offer the lowest amount an injured plaintiff will accept not to go to
court, i.e. SSF as defined in subsection 4.2. Whether the plaintiff is truly injured
or not, she will accept the offer. The total cost of this strategy for the defendant is
SSF +Rd = D − Cp +Rd.
2. The defendant can propose SSF =  (with  being a low positive value,  ≈ 0) so
that only an uninjured plaintiff accepts.36 However, a truly injured plaintiff will
refuse and will prefer to go to court. The total expected cost of this strategy is
(1 − α∗SF ) + α∗SF (D + Cd) + Rd, since there is a probability (1 − α∗SF ) that the
plaintiff is uninjured and accepts the settlement offer, and a probability α∗SF that
the claim is meritorious, so that the defendant spends costs Cd to go to court and
pays the damage D.
3. Last, the defendant can make no offer during the settlement period (SSF = 0). In
this case, if the plaintiff is uninjured, she drops off the case, and she goes to court
only if she is truly injured. The total cost of this strategy for the defendant is
α∗SF (D + Cd) +Rd.
The defendant will choose the lowest cost strategy. Making an offer SSF =  (the second
strategy) is always more costly than making no offer (the third strategy), since in both
cases, the defendant has to finance the cost to go to court if the claim is meritorious and
pays in addition  if the plaintiff is uninjured (SSF = ). The defendant has then to choose
between the first and the third strategy, i.e. offering SSF = D − Cp or making no offer
(SSF = 0) and going to court with an expected cost of α
∗
SF (D + Cd) +Rd.
Then, the defendant has better settle when the total expected cost under settlement is
lower than the expected total cost when going to court, i.e. when:
D − Cp +Rd ≤ α∗SF (D + Cd) +Rd
⇔ D − Cp
D + Cd
≤ α∗SF (13)
The threshold value of α∗SF allowing to separate the two strategies of the defendant is
denoted t∗SF =
D−Cp
D+Cd
. When α∗SF ≥ t∗SF , then it is cheaper for the defendant to settle
36If she does not accept, she will get zero since she will not go to court, knowing that she will get nothing
since her claim is frivolous.
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(ψ∗SF = 1) rather than to go to court. This can be interpreted as follows: the probability
that a plaintiff (that has filed a claim) is truly injured is so high that it will be too costly
for the defendant to go to trial (where he pays D+Cd whenever the claim is meritorious).
Symmetrically, the defendant goes to trial (ψ∗SF = 0) when α
∗
SF < t
∗
SF : the probability
that a plaintiff (that has filed a claim) is truly injured is low enough so that it is cheaper
to go to court (to verify whether the claim is frivolous or not) rather than to settle.
Let us now detail the strategy of the uninjured plaintiff.
5.1.2 The strategy of the uninjured plaintiff
The decision of the uninjured plaintiff to open a file or not depends on her own anticipation
of the defendant’s behavior (to settle or not), since she gains only in case of settlement.
To determine her strategy, we need to distinguish two cases: α ≥ t∗SF and α < t∗SF .
Let us first consider that α ≥ t∗SF : the probability that a plaintiff is truly injured (α)
is higher than the threshold above which the settlement strategy is less costly for the
defendant (t∗SF ). From (12) and (13), α
∗
SF ≥ α so that α∗SF ≥ t∗SF : the defendant always
prefers to settle (ψ∗SF = 1).
Since the uninjured plaintiff anticipates this decision, she always files a claim (θ∗SF = 1) to
get the settlement amount. The equilibrium is a pure strategy equilibrium: the plaintiff
always files a suit (θ∗SF = 1), and the defendant always settles (ψ
∗
SF = 1).
This can be interpreted as follows: the probability that a plaintiff is truly injured is so high
that the defendant prefers to settle rather than to go to trial. However, at equilibrium, if
the plaintiff is uninjured (which happens with a low probability), she earns a rent.
Let us now consider the case where α < t∗SF . Since from (12), α
∗
SF ≥ α, this does not
allow to compare t∗SF and α
∗
SF , and then to learn the defendant’s strategy to settle or to
go to court. We examine here the two possible strategies of the defendant and show that
no pure strategies equilibrium exists.
 Suppose first that the defendant always decides to settle. The uninjured plaintiff
always files a suit (θ∗SF = 1). Then, α
∗
SF =
α
α+(1−α)θ∗SF = α < t
∗
SF : from (13), it
would have been cheaper for the defendant to go to court rather than to settle.
 Suppose now that the defendant always decides to go to court. Then, the uninjured
plaintiff never opens a file so that θ∗SF = 0 and α
∗
SF = 1. From (13), in this situation
(α∗SF ≥ t∗SF ), it would be cheaper for the defendant to settle.
Then, the only equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium where the defendant decides
to settle with some probability, and an uninjured plaintiff files a suit with some other
probability. To characterize this equilibrium, we find θ∗SF and ψ
∗
SF so that the defendant
is indifferent between settling and going to trial, and an uninjured plaintiff is indifferent
between filing or not filing.
Under self finance, a plaintiff is indifferent between filing or not if:
ψ∗SFSSF −Rp − f = 0⇔ ψ∗SF =
Rp + f
SSF
=
Rp + f
D − Cp
where ψ∗SF represents the probability that the defendant chooses to settle at equilibrium.
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From (13), the defendant is indifferent between settling and going to court if α∗SF = t
∗
SF :
⇔ α
α+ θSF (1− α) =
D − Cp
D + Cd
⇔ θ∗SF =
α(Cp + Cd)
(1− α)(D − Cp)
where θ∗SF represents the probability that an uninjured plaintiff files a claim under self-
finance at equilibrium.
This mixed strategy equilibrium can be interpreted as follows: By sometimes going to
court, the defendant decreases the profit of the uninjured plaintiff, so that the uninjured
plaintiff opens a claim only with probability θ∗SF .
Lemma 4. Under self-finance:
When α ≥ t∗SF = D−CpD+Cd , a pure strategy equilibrium exists: ψ∗SF = θ∗SF = 1.
When α < t∗SF , there is no pure strategy equilibrium but a mixed strategy equilibrium
defined as follows:
ψ∗SF =
Rp + f
D − Cp ; θ
∗
SF =
α(Cp + Cd)
(1− α)(D − Cp)
Proof n°3 in the appendix shows that ψ∗SF and θ
∗
SF are proper probabilities, defined on
[0,1].
5.2 Equilibrium under contingent fees arrangements
The attorney observes whether the case is meritorious or not. If the case is meritorious, the
attorney asks a share βs of the gains in case of settlement and βt in case of trial, as defined
in section 4.2. However, if the case is frivolous, the attorney asks for a share βFs of the
settlement amount. The expected profit of the attorney will be ψCFβ
F
s SCF − Rp, where
ψCF is the probability that the defendant will settle under a contingent fee agreement.
37
The zero-profit condition under perfect competition implies that:
βFs =
Rp
ψCFSCF
(14)
The rate as defined by (14) is only applied for frivolous claims.38 We assume that the
rates defined between the attorney and the plaintiff are not observable to outsiders, else
the plaintiff’s type could be found by observing the rate asked by the attorney under
settlement.
37Let us note that ψCF > 0 is a necessary condition for the attorney to accept the case. Moreover,
contrary to Miceli [1994], we assume that the attorney fees (in case of settlement) are different when the
claim is meritorious or not, which explains why our results are slightly different than his. This assumption
seems consistent with the idea of free entry and competition among attorneys: plaintiffs may “shop around”
for the best rate which reduces opportunities for profit that could emerge if a attorney imposed the rate for
frivolous claims to meritorious ones. Also note that, since the plaintiff knows whether she is truly injured
or not, attorneys cannot try to misrepresent the merits of a case to the client and negotiates a higher
percentage rate.
38βFs is here larger than the rate asked when all the claims are meritorious. This can be explained by
the fact that a frivolous case is more risky because the plaintiff gets some compensation only if the case is
settled but not if it goes to court.
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As in the previous case, the defendant has two strategies: he can choose to settle for SCF
so that the plaintiff always accepts (whatever her type), or he can make no offer during the
settlement period and go to court only if the plaintiff is truly injured (so that the expected
cost of this strategy is α∗CF (D+Cd)). As previously, any offer between 0 and SCF will be
rejected by the truly injured plaintiff and accepted by the uninjured plaintiff. As long as
the truly injured plaintiff does not accept it, there is no reason to offer the frivolous one
anything at all. Then, the defendant prefers settling than going to court if the expected
cost to go to court is higher than the cost to settle:
α∗CF (D + Cd) +Rd ≥ SCF +Rd
⇔ α∗CF ≥
SCF
D + Cd
=
D − Cp
D + Cd
We denote t∗CF this threshold (above which the defendant always prefers to settle), so that
t∗CF =
D−Cp
D+Cd
. When α∗CF < t
∗
CF , the defendant makes no offer and goes to trial, because
the probability that the plaintiff is truly injured is too low and it would be too costly to
always settle rather than to go to court to see whether the plaintiff is truly injured. Then,
as under self finance, two types of equilibria arise. When α ≥ t∗CF , then the defendant
chooses to settle with any plaintiff that files a suit. The plaintiff files a claim, whatever
her type. A pure strategy equilibrium exists, defined as follows: θ∗CF = ψ
∗
CF = 1. When
α < t∗CF , the only equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium, as justified in the previous
subsection. The uninjured plaintiff is indifferent between filing or not filing if:
ψCF (1− βFs )SCF − f = 0 ⇒ ψCFSCF −Rp = f from (14)
⇒ ψ∗CF =
f +Rp
D − Cp
where ψ∗CF represents the probability that the defendant chooses to settle at equilibrium
under contingent fees arrangements. The defendant is indifferent between settling and
going to trial if:
α∗CF = t
∗
CF ⇒
α
α+ (1− α)θCF =
D − Cp
D + Cd
(15a)
⇒ θ∗CF = (
α
1− α)[
(Cp + Cd)
(D − Cp) ] (15b)
where θ∗CF represents the probability that an uninjured plaintiff opens a claim at equilib-
rium, under contingent fees arrangements. Let us note that θ∗SF = θ
∗
CF , ψ
∗
SF = ψ
∗
CF , and
t∗CF = t
∗
SF . The probabilities with which an uninjured plaintiff files a claim and that the
claim is settled are the same under contingent fees and self-finance.
Lemma 5. Under contingent fees arrangements:
When α ≥ t∗CF = D−CpD+Cd , a pure strategy equilibrium exists, θ∗CF = ψ∗CF = 1.
When α < t∗CF , there is only a mixed strategy equilibrium such that:
ψ∗CF =
f +Rp
D − Cp ; θ
∗
CF = (
α
1− α)[
(Cp + Cd)
(D − Cp) ]
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5.3 Equilibrium under third-party financing
The funders observe whether the plaintiff is truly injured or not. As described in subsection
4.4, the shares of the recovery asked by the funders are γs and γt for meritorious claims.
When a claim is frivolous, the plaintiff may ask to be financed with the hopes to obtaining
some settlement. In this case, she gives up a share γFs ∈ (0, 1) to the funders:39
γFs ψTST −Rp
Rp
= k ⇒ γFs =
(k + 1)Rp
ψTST
(16)
Let us note that γFs ≥ γs: the funders ask for a higher share of the gains when the claim
is frivolous (in comparaison to a meritorious claim), because the outcome is more risky.
Let us now determine the strategies of each party. The defendant has to choose between
settling for ST so that the plaintiff accepts (whatever her type), or making no offer so that
he goes to court only if the plaintiff is truly injured. We apply the same demonstration
as in subsection 5.1. The defendant is indifferent between settling and going to court if
α∗T (D + Cd) = ST . This implies:
α∗T =
D − (k + 1)Cp
D + Cd
(17)
Let us denote t∗T this threshold (
D−(k+1)Cp
D+Cd
= t∗T ), then symmetrically to the previous
cases, whenever α ≥ t∗T , a pure strategy equilibrium exists, so that θ∗T = ψ∗T = 1. In other
words, the probability that a plaintiff is truly injured is so high that the defendant always
prefers to settle than to go to court. The plaintiff (whether truly injured or not) files a
claim, but the probability that she is truly injured remains high enough for the settlement
strategy to be the most appropriate strategy for the defendant.
When α < t∗T , i.e. when the probability that a plaintiff is truly injured is low, there is only
a mixed strategy equilibrium. The best strategy is for the defendant to go to trial with
some probability ψT and for the uninjured plaintiff to file a claim with some probability
θT . This equilibrium implies that the uninjured plaintiff is indifferent between filing or not
filing, i.e.:
ψT (1− γFs )ST − f = 0⇒ ψT (ST −
(k + 1)Rp
ψT
) = f
⇒ ψ∗T =
f + (k + 1)Rp
D − (k + 1)Cp
The defendant is indifferent between settling and going to trial if α∗T = t
∗
T . This implies:
α
α+ (1− α)θT =
D − (k + 1)Cp
D + Cd
⇔ α(D + Cd) = [D − (k + 1)Cp]α+ (1− α)[D − (k + 1)Cp]θT
39If the settlement fails, the plaintiff drops off the case instead of going to court, since her claim is
frivolous. Then, there is no need to define a share of the recovery for the funders in this situation.
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⇔ θ∗T = (
α
(1− α))[
(k + 1)Cp + Cd
D − (k + 1)Cp ] (18)
Lemma 6. Under third-party financing:
When α ≥ t∗T , a pure strategy equilibrium exists, so that θ∗T = ψ∗T = 1.
When α < t∗T , we observe a mixed strategy equilibrium, defined as follows:
ψ∗T =
f+(k+1)Rp
D−(k+1)(Cp) and θ
∗
T = (
α
(1−α))(
(k+1)Cp+Cd
D−(k+1)Cp )
5.4 Comparison of equilibria
We compare here the thresholds separating pure and mixed strategies (t∗i ), the probabilities
that the case filed and settled (ψ∗i ), and the probabilities that an uninjured plaintiff files
a claim under each type of litigation financing (θ∗i ). This comparison allows to show that
third-party financing leads to the highest probability of settlement (even when these cases
are frivolous), and to the highest probability that an uninjured plaintiff files a claim.
Let us first compare the different threshold t∗i separating pure and mixed strategies.
t∗SF = t
∗
CF =
D − Cp
D + Cd
(19a) and t∗T =
D − (k + 1)Cp
D + Cd
(19b)
Then, it comes that t∗S = t
∗
CF ≥ t∗T . Third-party financing leads to a lower threshold: the
proportion of pure strategies equilibria where all claims (whether meritorious or frivolous)
settle is then higher.
Second, let us compare the fraction ψ∗i of cases filed that settle under mixed strategies.
These probabilites are:
ψ∗SF = ψ
∗
CF =
Rp + f
D − Cp (20a) and ψ
∗
T =
Rp(k + 1) + f
D − (k + 1)Cp (20b)
Then, when k = 0, ψ∗T = ψ
∗
SF = ψ
∗
CF ; and when k > 0, ψ
∗
T (k) > ψ
∗
SF = ψ
∗
CF : third-party
financing leads to a higher probability that a defendant chooses to settle compared to
self finance or contingent fees arrangements.40 Since the equilibrium settlement amount
is lower under third-party financing than under alternative financing systems, this creates
higher incentives for the defendant to decide to settle rather than to go to court.
Last, we compare the probabilities that an uninjured plaintiff files suit in mixed strategies.
θ∗SF = θ
∗
CF =
α(Cp + Cd)
(1− α)(D − Cp) (21a) and θ
∗
T = (
α
1− α)[
(k + 1)Cp + Cd
D − (k + 1)Cp ] (21b)
Then, when k = 0, then θ∗T (0) = θ
∗
SF = θ
∗
CF , while when k > 0, θ
∗
T (k) > θ
∗
SF = θ
∗
CF .
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Third-party financing leads to a higher probability that an uninjured plaintiff files a claim:
40We note that
∂ψ∗T
∂k
=
Rp(D−(k+1)Cp)+(f+Rp(k+1))Cp
(D−(k+1)Cp)2 ≥ 0, and ψ
∗
T (0) = ψ
∗
SF = ψ
∗
CF . This result seems
consistent with the empirical evidence about third-party financing provided by Chen and Abrams [2013]:
they find a marked decrease in the average number of appearances each party made before the court in
jurisdictions, and interpret it to indicate a corresponding increase in out-of-court resolution between the
parties, i.e. settlement.
41This comes from θ∗T (0) = 0 and
∂θ∗T
∂k
= α
(1−α) ×
Cp(D−(k+1)Cp)+((k+1)Cp+Cd)Cp
(D−(k+1)Cp)2 ≥ 0.
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since the probability that the defendant decides to settle is higher, this creates higher
incentives for an uninjured plaintiff to file a claim, with the hopes of obtaining gains
through settlement.
Proposition 2.
When k > 0, the probability that an uninjured plaintiff files a claim is higher under third-
party financing than under contingent fees or self-finance.
This proposition seems consistent with the empirical results of Chen and Abrams [2013]: Of
the 123 claims fully or partially funded and closed by IMF (the largest Australian company
funding litigations), 83 were settled out of court, 25 were withdrawn or “dropped” and five
lost while 10 won at trial. As underlined by Veljanovski [2012], this indicates a relatively
high “drop rate” of over 20 %.
6 Conclusion
In many countries, legislators wonder whether the introduction of third-party financing
will help to overcome the cost barrier to access to justice. Even if external funders have
larger means than attorneys, the cost to organize a three-player relationship is higher than
a traditional bilateral relationship. Since legislation allows funders to consider both direct
and indirect charges when defining the share of the recovery they ask in case of success,
they only select claims whose “profitability rate” (or rate of return on capital) is large
enough to cover all types of costs they support. Then, our model shows that third-party
financing: (i) does not allow to finance all types of meritorious claims, (ii) gives uninjured
plaintiffs higher incentives to open a file (compared to the other types of financing), so
that it may benefit more to uninjured plaintiffs than to truly injured ones.
This does not mean that third-party financing should be banned. Our model simply shows
that by solving a problem (the cost barrier to access to justice), third-party financing is
likely to create other difficulties, as the increase of frivolous claims. Our results also show
that third-party financing is worthwhile when funders do not require a too high rate of
return on capital. However, when their requirement for profitability is high, the difficulties
raised by third-party financing are likely to be high (few claims are financed and settlement
amounts are low). This may explain why some legislators are reluctant to introduce such
a practice.
Our analysis is a first step towards a better understanding of third-party financing, but
could be deepened in several ways. For instance, we consider litigation costs mainly as
attorney costs. However, in practice, additional external costs may appear (Rubin [2011]).
For instance, defendants may support additional opportunity costs of time and efforts.
These include time spent in searching files for documents in response to document re-
quests, time spent in preparation for depositions and testimony, and time spent in tes-
timony itself. One could also argue that the attention of the managers will be diverted
from profit making endeavors to the lawsuit. Reputational costs are also under silence in
our model. Our conclusion about the increase in the incentives of an uninjured plaintiff
to file a claim could be softened if we introduce potential reputational costs of supporting
frivolous litigation for third-party funders. The risk for the funders is to be associated
with nuisance suits, and its involvement in a particular case could undercut the plaintiff’s
bargaining power to the extent that it suggests the claim is without merit. However, such
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an analysis also calls for strong assumptions, in particular as regards to the structure of
information between players in a repeated setting.
More broadly, our theoretical framework is based on assumptions that can be discussed.
First, regarding the information structure of the game, many parameters are deterministic
and public knowledge (D, Cp once realized, C¯, C¯, Rp, f). We could introduce some risk
or uncertainty on these parameters that could impact the behavior of the plaintiff, the at-
torneys or the funders. For instance, funders may more easily support risk than the other
agents, which could change the results regarding the decision to finance a claim or the
equilibrium settlement amounts. The plaintiff and the attorneys could prefer to transfer
the risk regarding the outcome of the claim to some external investors. We need further
researches to deal with the consequences of risk and uncertainty in such a model.
Another assumption we make is that attorneys and funders operate on competitive mar-
kets. This assumption is discussed in the literature (Osiel [1990], Hadfield [2000], Crabdall
and Winston [2011]). In our model, if attorneys or funders had market powers, they could
put pressure on the plaintiff’s decision to settle or to go to court. This could impact the
equilibrium settlement amounts.
Moreover, the focus of our paper is on nuisance suits, so that we comment the increase
in the likelihood of settlement (under third-party financing) on nuisance suits. Yet, some
other positive consequences could be mentioned: more settlement could decrease the total
litigation costs by avoiding to go to court. Other benefits could be less congestion at trial
and fewer opportunity costs of time and efforts for the parties.
Let us also add that we do not discuss in our model the question of the optimal num-
ber of litigation. We take for granted that a plaintiff deserves to be compensated, and
that this compensation is higher than the total amount of costs required to get it (∀Cp ∈
[Cminp ;C
max
p ], D−Rp−Cp− f > 0). As a consequence, we do not discuss whether the in-
crease in the probability to access to justice under third-party financing is socially efficient
or not. It is sometimes argued that the additional lawsuits that would occur as a result
of third party financing would have more social costs than social benefits (Rubin [2011]).
This point deserves further research.42
Another extension could be to consider that the amount of money the parties have at
disposal to finance their claims may influence the size of the damage, or the probability
to win the case. This should call for a model where both parties (i.e. the plaintiff and
the defendant) could benefit from contingency fees or third-party funders. Then, not only
could the litigation costs of the plaintiffs vary, but also that of the defendant (Cd). How-
ever, this analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, where our primary concerns are the
access to justice for truly injured plaintiffs and the number of frivolous claims that are
settled in each type of litigation financing system.
To account for the current debates about litigation financing in Europe, we focus on self-
finance, contingent fees and third-party financing. However, insurances are also developing
to finance litigation ( “before the event insurance” or “after the event insurance” (Faure
and De Mot [2012])).
Last, we do not consider in this model the problem of product liability system, when it
is the result of a series of legal changes brought about through litigation (especially in
common law countries). Attorneys acting through their associations may coordinate in-
42A complete analysis of this question would require a complex model taking also into account the social
benefit of the change in behavior brought about through the threat of easier access to court thanks to third
party financing.
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formation, choose and sequence lawsuits in such a way as to create precedents favorable
to expansion of law. While some attorneys have contributed to changing the legal rules,
some others have been rather “free-riders” by benefiting from these changes without con-
tributing. Third-party funders are likely to be involved in many cases as a method of
diversification. This means that they will be able to internalize more of the effects of legal
changes than could individual law firms, and so will contribute more to financing litigation
leading to policy changes. The danger is that third-party financing could lead to increase
the number of inefficient precedents (Rubin [2011]). We intend to take into account these
additional effects in further researches.
Appendix
Proof n°1 (Proof of subsection 4.5. - First part):
We show here that ∃kˆ, so that ∀k ∈ (0, kˆ], xT (k) ≥ xCF and ∀k > kˆ, xT (k) < xCF .
xT (k) ≤ xCF ⇔ Cˆ(k) ≤ C¯
⇔ (D − f)
(k + 1)
−Rp ≤ C¯
⇔ D − f
C¯ +Rp
≤ k + 1
⇔ D − f − C¯ −Rp
C¯ +Rp
≤ k
We denote kˆ =
D−f−C¯−Rp
C¯+Rp
. Since Cˆ(k) is a continuous and decreasing function in k, then
∀k ∈ (0, kˆ), xT (k) ≥ xCF and ∀k > kˆ, xT (k) < xCF .43
Proof n°2 (Proof of subsection 4.5. - Second Part):
We show here that the settlement amount under third-party financing is still lower than
the equilibrium settlement amounts under contingent fees or self-finance if we use Nash
bargaining rather than “take-it-or-leave-it” offer.
Under self-finance, the minimum settlement amount SSF the plaintiff accepts is SSF =
D−Cp as defined in equation (1). Since settling rather than going to court allows to save
on litigation costs (Cp + Cd), the parties can share these gains under a Nash-bargaining
process, so that the settlement amount becomes SNBSF = D − Cp + Cd+Cp2 = D + Cd−Cp2 .
Under contingent fees, the minimum settlement amount for the plaintiff is SCF as defined
in (2), and the net gain from settling rather than going to court are still (Cp +Cd) so that
the settlement amount under Nash Bargaining is SNBCF = D +
Cd−Cp
2 .
Last, under third-party financing, gains from settling rather than going to court are higher
since settlement allows to save (Cd + Cp(k + 1)). Using Nash bargaining, the settlement
amount would be SNBT = D +
Cd−Cp(k+1)
2 .
As a consequence, equation (11) still holds: ∀k ≥ 0, ST (k) ≤ SSF = SCF .
43It is straightforward to show that kˆ > 0 since C¯ ∈ [Cminp , Cmaxp ] and ∀Cp ∈ [Cminp , Cmaxp ], D − Cp −
Rp − f > 0.
24
Proof n°3 (Proof of Lemmas 4, 5 and 6):
Let us show that ψ∗SF ∈ [0, 1] and θ∗SF ∈ [0, 1].
ψ∗SF =
Rp + f
D − Cp
By assumptions, D − Rp − Cp − f > 0, Rp ≥ 0, Cp > 0, f ≥ 0, this implies that
D − Cp ≥ Rp + f ≥ 0⇔ 0 ≤ Rp+fD−Cp ≤ 1.
In addition, mixed strategies are defined when α ≤ D−CpD+Cd = t∗SF .
α ≤ D − Cp
D + Cd
⇒ α(D + Cd) ≤ D − Cp
⇒ α(Cp + Cd) ≤ (1− α)(D − Cp)
⇒ 0 ≤ α(Cp + Cd)
(1− α)(D − Cp) = θ
∗
SF ≤ 1
A similar demonstration can show that ψ∗CF ∈ [0, 1] and θ∗CF ∈ [0, 1].
Last, from equation (9), we have D − (Cp + Rp)(k + 1) − f ≥ 0, which implies that
0 ≤ ψ∗T = f+Rp(k+1)D−(k+1)Cp ≤ 1. Since mixed strategies are established under third-party
financing when α ≤ t∗T = D−(k+1)CpD+(k+1)Cd , this implies that 0 ≤ θ∗T =
α(Cp(k+1)+Cd)
(1−α)(D−(k+1)Cp) ≤ 1.
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